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Defeating Environmental Law: The
Geology of Legal Advantage
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
It is a singular honor to discuss issues of environmental
law at the Pace University School of Law. Lloyd K. Garrison,
in whose honor this lecture is named, was one of the great
lawyers of his time. Your Dean, Richard Ottinger, as a young
member of Congress a quarter century ago, was one of the
first to raise issues of environmental law. My immediate
predecessor on this podium, David Sive, is the most respected
environmental lawyer in the country. My debts to him are
too numerous to mention. Your faculty has also instructed
me in many ways. To mention but two outstanding individu-
als, no one working in the field can escape the influence of
Nicholas A. Robinson on the National Environmental Policy
Act or Jeffrey Miller on Clean Water Act enforcement.
My talk today will: (1) introduce the metaphor of geol-
ogy, (2) suggest to you that complexity has "gainers" as well
as "losers," and (3) show you how environmental laws can be
defeated by these twin engines of complexity and clever
human adversaries.
I. The Metaphor of Geology
Complexity is the first word students and practitioners of
environmental law learn. The primary reason for this is that
environmental law is the result of an additive process where
layer upon layer is added to the preexisting strata as if
* William H. Rodgers, Jr., University of Washington School of Law. Ap-
preciation for editing is expressed to Shelley Pellegrino, 3L, University of
Washington School of Law. Appreciation for comments on an earlier draft is
expressed to E. Donald Elliott, Esq., students of the Environmental Research
Workshop Series, Professor Richard Lazarus, Georgetown University Law
Center and the Environmental & Experimental Economic Forum, Professor
Ronald G. Cummings, Georgia State University School of Policy Studies.
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guided by the laws of geology. There are occasional reduc-
tions in this cumulative mass (for example, the repealers that
are featured in high school civics classes), but they are far
outnumbered by the additions, accretions, faults, folds, and
fractures that mar the surface and shape the deep content of
this legal world. Graphic 1 in the Appendix provides a small
idea of the roster of law that has piled up in Columbia River
law offices as fishing has declined. A similar picture could be
drawn for the Hudson River. Graphics of this sort, however,
do not begin to reveal the displacements, seams, reversals,
and exceptions that are buried in this law.
To elaborate further on this geological metaphor,
Graphic 2 is a picture of the "Erosional History of the Appa-
lachian Mountains." It conveys nicely, the ridges, valleys,
and fronts that can develop due to uneven accumulations of
geology. Graphic 3 depicts "Devonian Sedimentary Rocks of
New York State." It clearly demonstrates how deposit upon
deposit from different ages make up the whole.
II. The Practice of Advantage
In nature, social burdens are the unwelcome by-product
of activities that offer individual advantage. Nobody enjoys
the complexity of environmental laws, yet many gain from it.
It is not difficult to discern the primary beneficiaries of
this mass of complexity called environmental law. They are
the lawyers who use their guile to trace a satisfactory path
down the seam of Law A to its intersection with Law B, just
below the surface of Law C. They are the judges who impart
their wisdom to discern when Law 26 is impliedly repealed by
Law 49. They are the lawmakers who reap the benefits of
cleaning up a river not once, not twice, but three times with
three different laws, and who later reap the benefits of fash-
ioning exemptions that permit escape from the collective re-
pression they created.
These environmental law people need not even be thank-
ful to the hand that feeds them. Environmental law itself,
and the mostly anonymous process that produces it, is a bet-
ter scapegoat than the Corps of Engineers. These fine law-
[Vol. 15
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yers can sneer at the ambiguities while they seek to widen
them, and these wise judges can condemn the complexity
while they add yet another layer to it.
Lawyers thrive on the complexity they pretend to despise
because complexity multiplies opportunities for legal objec-
tion and contention. It creates niches of advantage where un-
welcome laws can be ambushed, stifled, and avoided. It
creates cracks and seams into which fine legal differences can
flow. The environmental laws have been damaged gravely by
these predations. Several legal tactics used to defeat these
laws are defined in Attachment 1: (1) neglect, (2) diversion,
(3) acquisition and sale, (4) abandonment, (5) process trans-
formation, (6) exception, (7) pretense, and (8) marginaliza-
tion. I will draw on examples from across the environmental
field but will focus primarily on the Pacific Northwest where
the great salmon have come under the "protection" of envi-
ronmental laws.
III. Tactics of Legal Advantage
A. Neglect: Law as Joke
Environmental literature is filled with references to legal
directions not taken, legal opportunities not exploited, and
legal commitments not remembered.1 Agencies, for example,
are empowered to choose the laws they will enforce. They can
chart their own course through the jumbled legal geologies
erected in their paths. But the power to choose also includes
the discretion to disregard. In the environmental field, this
body of disregarded law is so conspicuous that it has been
given a name - "sleeper" - meaning a law or rule that is for-
1. See e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Par-
ity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia
Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657, 669-70 (1991) (Northwest Power Act); THE NORTHWEST
SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 111-15 (Joseph Cone & Sandy
Ridlington eds., 1996) [hereinafter 1996 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; J. B. Ruhl,
Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamic Law-and-Society System: A
Wake-Up Call for Legal Revolution and the Modern Administrative State, 45
DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); Peter Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Conse-
quences and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992).
1997]
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gotten, buried, or ignored.2 A conspicuous reason for sleepers
is that the responsible agency puts them to bed as unworthy
of attention. Sleepers are forever in danger of slipping be-
neath the radar because there is little in them that promises
administrative advantage, and there is much in them that
creates discomfort. Some legal rules are not worth knowing
from the agency's perspective.
The Corps of Engineers has always selectively inter-
preted the law. The Corps' most celebrated neglect in the en-
vironmental field was its startlingly narrow reading of its
power to forbid discharges of refuse under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899. 3 The Corps understood this law as rul-
ing out only discharges that in and of themselves obstructed
navigation.
For three generations, into the Nixon Administration,
dischargers could pollute with impunity and destroy fish and
ruin spawning grounds. The only things they could not do, in
the Corps' view, was fill up the waterways with solids so that
ships could not pass, or cover the waterways with flammables
that might deter navigation. When this 1899 law was uncov-
ered as an anti-pollution weapon in the 1970s, it was de-
scribed as a great "sleeper" and was condemned for the
surprises it contained. The Corps of Engineers had adminis-
tered the anesthesia.
Another unnoticed environmental law, effective since
1965, is Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, which affords
considerable legal leverage over dams by inviting states to
determine whether a project complies with state water qual-
ity standards. 4 These water quality standards contain a
number of provisions (e.g., minimum-flow requirements,
2. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology
Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 25 (1993); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lessons of the Red Squirrel:
Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 161 (1989); William.H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the
Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4
FLA. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377 (1989).
3. See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER
§ 4.11 (1986).
4. See id., § 4.16 at 252-54.
[Vol. 15
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rapid fluctuation constraints) that are designed to be "fish-
friendly."5 A state's power to certify is the power to say "no"
to a project, which makes the law extremely valuable as cur-
rency, even to those who are disposed more to selling it than
enforcing it. But this law was not sold; it was scrupulously
ignored even though it offered glory and fulfillment to law-
yers driven by ambition.
The legal dormancy of section 401 lasted for almost
thirty years, which is about as long as it takes for a genera-
tion of lawyers who knows nothing about environmental law
to pass from the scene.6 For whatever reason, legal entrepre-
neurs eventually discovered Section 401. It was thrust fur-
ther into prominence by a 1994 Supreme Court decision. 7
Thus, Section 401 is now back on the legal monitor and part
of sharply-contested territory. It is threatened now not by
desuetude but by an explicit repealer by an antagonistic
Congress.8
B. Diversion: Law as Specialty
The cracks and fissures of environmental laws enable
law managers to use their specialty and exploit the fissures to
defeat otherwise good intentions. The Columbia River
salmon, for example, have been destroyed by state water laws
that are immune from federal environmental laws and strate-
gically placed to defeat Indian treaty fishing rights. The
crown jewel in this legal strategy is the McCarren Amend-
5. See Debra L. Donohue, The Untapped Power of the Clean Water Act Sec-
tion 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996); Katherine Ransel, The Sleeping Giant
Awakens: PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 25
ENVTL. L. 255 (1995).
6. See T.S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.,
1970).
7. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County. v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700 (1994).
8. Section 401 was seriously damaged in the House-passed version of the
Clean Water Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995) (colloquially
known as the "dirty water" bill). See BILL GHENT, ENVTL. & ENERGY INST.,
SPEC. STATUS REP., AwAITED SENATE CLEAN WATER BILL EXPECTED TO DIFFER
FROM HOUSE VERSION 29 (1995).
1997]
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ment of 1953, 9 which allows suits against the United States
(and by extension the tribes) in state courts "for the adjudica-
tion of rights to the use of water of a river system."10 On the
Yakima River, a tributary to the Columbia, this law produced
a grotesque rule for in-stream salmon protection known as
the bare minimum standard; it ensures that the fish have
enough water to maintain a precarious existence.1'
Another legal offshoot on the Columbia River is the
cleanup of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, described in leg-
islative documents as the "largest civil works project ever un-
dertaken."1 2 Polluted soils and groundwater at Hanford are
measured in cubic miles. Many have written about this res-
ervoir of pollution from the bombmaking years, the magni-
tude and severity of which is without planetary precedent.' 3
The Indian tribes have an interest in this cleanup. The
landscape, 560 square miles of it, is a source of game. It is
also extraordinarily rich in archaeological treasures and In-
dian artifacts. Fish have thrived in the last free-flowing
9. 43 U.S.C.A. § 666 (1994), construed in Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
10. Compare Panel on Conjunctive Management: Idaho Water Policy in the
Wake of Musser, Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Water Policy & Sus-
tainability in the Columbia Basin, (May 19, 20, 1995), with DAVID H. GETCHES,
WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 334-38 (3d ed. 1990) (elaborating on the McCarran
Amendment).
11. See Order of the trial court in the Aquavella General Adjudication (Nov.
29, 1990); see id., the Flushing Flow Order (April 13, 1995); In re State of Wash-
ington Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P. 2d 1306,
1310, 1325 (1993) (justifying loss of fishing rights by the payment of an Indian
Claims Commission judgment; the measure of the right "is the minimum in-
stream flow necessary to maintain anadromous fish life in the river, according
to annual prevailing conditions").
12. STEVEN M. BLUSH & THOMAS H. HEITMAN, TRAIN WRECK ALONG THE
RIVER OF MONEY: AN EVALUATION OF THE HANFORD CLEANUP 1-1 (1995) (report
prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources)
[hereinafter 1995 TRAIN WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD].
13. See e.g., M. D'ANoNio, ATOMIC HARVEST: HANFORD AND THE LEGAL
TOLL OF AMERICA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL (1993); Paul Wilson, "Cold War Legacy -
Hanford," in Natural Resources Law Institute, Northwestern School of Law, 5
NRLI News 1, 4 (June 1994) (nearly 2/3 of the nation's high-level radioactive
waste is found at Hanford; in the period of peak operation (mid-50s to mid-60s),
Hanford was running eight single-pass nuclear reactors whose sole job was to
convert uranium to plutonium; altogether, the government produced 53,000
kilograms of plutonium for the weapons program at Hanford).
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/1
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stretch of the river that abuts the reservation. 14 However,
leaking groundwater and looming tanks (approximately 177
apartment buildings in size) hold the future of the river hos-
tage. Protecting Indian fishing was not the principal busi-
ness at Hanford, and it is not the chief aim of the cleanup. 15
The immediate problem is whether the cleanup will come to
resemble fenced-off permanent pollution zones. Some areas
of Hanford cannot possibly be upgraded to meet the require-
ments for future residential or commercial use. The Depart-
ment of Energy thus is promoting a recreational use standard
that would limit fishermen to river access fifty-five days of
the year.
The diversion point that consigns challenges to the Han-
ford cleanup to some legally distant Pluto is Section 113(h) of
the Superfund law. 16 Section 113(h) declares that lawsuits
that deal with disputes over cleanups must await completion
of construction activities. In the case of Hanford, this eagerly
anticipated date, barring extensions, might be: 2018, when
some units are supposed to be cleaned up; 2055, when reactor
cores are supposed to be removed; or it might be 2118, 121
14. See Shauna Whidden Study Paper, The Hanford Reach: Protecting the
Columbia's Last Safe Haven for Salmon, (Northwest Water Law & Policy Pro-
ject), Nw. SCH. L. OF LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE, (1995).
15. The risk-assessments that are being done by the Department of Energy
are nine parts deception. See 1995 TRAIN WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD, supra
note 12, at 8-9. This is before any correction is made for the embarrassing fact
that the Indians along the river consume fish at a rate 6-8-10 times that of the
norm used in EPA risk assessments. See COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH
COMM'N, Press Release, Oct. 7, 1994, Study Reveals Columbia River Tribal
Members May Be Exposed to Higher Levels of Dioxin and Other Toxics. This
disparity between Indian and non-Indian fish consumption is so well known
that it received mention in President Clinton's 1994 Executive Order on Envi-
ronmental Justice. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) ("Fed-
eral Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations"). Few expect that abstractions such as the health of
Indians will greatly influence cleanup budgets measured in the billions of
dollars.
On the work of the Department of Energy, see BLAINE HARDEN, A RIVER
LOST: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE COLUMBIA ch. 8 (1996) ("Wild and Scenic
Atomic River"); Gerald F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated
Place in the United States, 38 Amiz. L. REV. 105 (1996).
16. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (1994). See also, 4 William H. Rodgers, Jr.,
Environmental Law: Hazardous Waste & Substances § 8.3, at 509-11 (1992).
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years from the present, when unrestricted use of land and
groundwater is to be achieved. 17
In effect, tribes must wait fifty or sixty years before they
are permitted to go before a judge to argue about a risk as-
sessment, which is mostly a figment of scientific imagination,
to obtain relief that consists merely of rearranging future and
distant guesses. One finds little difference between civilized
law of this sort and pure farce.
C. Acquisition and Sale: Law as Currency
1. Selling Salmon Protection
There was nothing inherently wrong with Washington's
pre-statehood salmon-protection laws dating to 1881. They
required fishways or other means of passage to overcome ob-
structions in streams used by anadromous fish. The wrong
came when the authorities presumed to sell or trade this
power to say "no." This ready disposition to make fish-protec-
tion negotiable was facilitated by the win-win ideologies of
the day. It was underwritten by the convenient fiction that
hatcheries were a satisfactory recompense for natural stocks.
But the law made these transactions stick, not by encourag-
ing the de facto sales of natural fish runs, but by declaring
that the buyer who succeeded in corrupting the process ac-
quired a property right that could not be taken back.
This power of the transaction to rechannel evolutionary
histories and to penetrate into the distant future is being
played out today on the Elwha River."' Thus, politicians sit
in solemn judgment to decide whether $29.5 million should
be paid to beneficiaries of the current dam owners. 19 It made
17. See 1995 TRAIN WRECK STUDY ON HANFORD, supra note 12, at 1-19, 1-45,
46; See id. at 125 ("The EPA and Ecology have adopted a schedule of cleanup for
the 100 areas that is at least a hundred years longer than the schedule in the
[Tripartite Agreement] for cleanup of all operable units at the site") (emphasis
added). See id.
18. See BRUCE BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOuDs: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD
SALMON ch. 6 (1982).
19. The payments are to be made to the "beneficiaries" because it is not
even known who is the "owner" of the Elwha Dam. This is claimed to be "confi-
dential." Interview with Russ Busch, Seattle attorney, (Jan. 1997). Compare
Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. Law No. 102-495,
[Vol. 15
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/1
DEFEATING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
no sense to sell these great fish runs in 1910. It made no
sense to protect the intrusion in 1992 by promising extrava-
gant compensation by law as if it were some inescapable con-
stitutional obligation. The only outcome that makes less
sense would be to leave the dams in the river because the
constitutional duty contrived by lawyers has become too
expensive.
This problem of purchased law is no small or parochial
thing. The licensing process of the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) has left many bargained-for proper-
ties in the rivers with fifty-year licenses being the legal norm.
Firm properties also have been erected under the tolerant
auspices of FERC. The worst giveaways are protected into
the distant future because the law transforms bureaucratic
trepidation into constitutionally protected property.
2. Selling the Protection of Endangered Species
The latest law for sale is frequently referred to as the
strongest environmental law in the United States. Section 9
of the Endangered Species Act (Act) makes it a crime to
"take" any protected species. 20 This statute is powerful be-
cause it is possible to "take" with the weapons of environmen-
tal damage, and it applies to private as well as public owners.
The most impressive visual image of Section 9 is the picture
of the famous owl circles on the Plum Creek Timber property
in the mid-Cascades (Graphic 4, "Owl Circles on Plum Creek
106 Stat. 3173 (Oct. 24, 1992) with Letter to the Editor from Senator Slade
Gorton, There are other National Parks Projects That Need Federal Money, SE-
ATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 16, 1997, at C2 ("Before we can remove the
Elwha dams, we must acquire them. To acquire them will cost $29.5 million.
To spend that amount of money in a single year means that the Elwha dams
would consume roughly half of the National Park Service budget for the entire
nation's park land acquisition.... [This would be] unfair to other states [and
explains why] I have appropriated $4 million [in each of the last two years]
toward the acquisition of the Elwha dams."). Id.
20. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(G), § 9(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1994). See also
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1016-21 (2d ed.,
1994) [hereinafter 1994 HORNBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
19971
9
10 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Timber Property"). 21 These circles represent all of the places
that cannot be logged.
Section 9 finds itself for sale and auction because Section
10 of the Act permits the "incidental" taking of protected spe-
cies if the landowner is committed to a "habitat conservation
plan" that offers some protection for a listed species. 22 Like
the FERC lawyers before them, who perfected a variety of
hatchery fictions to justify their "incidental" intrusions, attor-
neys for the timber companies now proudly come forth with
imaginative sustainable practices that will protect the owls
and the fish into the distant future if made part of an accepta-
ble deal. 23 Like the FERC lawyers before them, these attor-
neys justify their predictions to their own satisfaction with
state-of-the-art modeling and impressive graphics. Like the
FERC lawyers before them, these attorneys insist that there
can be no deals without the certainty afforded by long-term
properties, meaning that habit conservation plans can extend
for 100 or 150 years. 24 Like the FERC lawyers before them,
this new generation of attorneys who write habitat conserva-
tion plans is confident that changed attitudes, goodwill and
modern education can defeat any small limitations in antici-
pating the needs of the fish in the creative documents they
write.
However, the negotiators who specialize in habitat con-
servation plans for endangered species have one bargaining
chip that the FERC licensees lack. They are empowered to
destroy habitat and limit the options for the fish while negoti-
ations proceed. They can do this because they already own
21. See James A. Kraft, Plum Creek Timber Co., "Large Landowner: Plum
Creek HCP," Law Seminars International, Program on the Endangered Species
Act, Jan. 30-31, 1997 (Meydenbauer Center, Bellevue, Wash.).
22. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). See also, 1994 HORNBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 21, at 1020-21.
23. See Law Seminars International, Program on the Endangered Species
Act (Jan. 30-31, 1997) (Meydenbauer Center, Bellevue, Wash.) (presentations of
Jeffry B. Van Duzer, Esq., Davis Wright Tremaine, Curt Smitch, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, James A. Kraft, Esq., Plum Creek Timber Co., Jan Pauw, Esq.
Weyerhaeuser Co.).
24. Jan Pauw, Senior Legal Counsel, Weyerhaeuser Co., ESA Litigation
Risks: How Do They Affect Landowner Behavior and How Can They Best Be
Managed? Program on the Endangered Species Act.
[Vol. 15
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/1
DEFEATING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
the habitat that is at issue, whereas the dam makers only
hope to own it. Routinely, these landowners say that busi-
ness necessities counsel the avoidance of an infestation by en-
dangered species. Landowners search for endangered
species, not to protect them but to find places where they are
not. This is the land that then can be harvested, modified, or
transformed.
Nevertheless, it is the prevailing view that habitat con-
servation plans are one of the great hopes for saving the
salmon, just as the FERC licenses were previously thought to
be. They embody a spirit of tolerance extended to kills that
are merely incidental, create nonnegotiable properties pro-
jected into a distant future, and are sustained by a win-win
ideology. Finally, they are justified by optimism that protect-
ing the fish requires only marginal improvements in caution.
We will not know until well into the twenty-first century
whether this wave of optimism proves to be so firmly
grounded.
D. Abandonment: Law as Liability
It is intuitively difficult to explain why an agency might
opt for trading or abandoning a powerful law while cher-
ishing or honoring a weak one. But one reason why this
abandonment occurs is that enforcing powerful laws such as
the no-take provisions of the Endangered Species Act can in-
spire resistance and backlash. Such costs can more than off-
set the gains in jurisdictional authority.
One strong salmon-protector in the legal arsenal that the
flow of events quietly shelved is the Washington Hydraulics
Law, first enacted in 1943.25 Fortuitously, perhaps, this law
had a substantial advantage over later (1972) amendments to
the federal Clean Water Act. It focused on the key parame-
ters of hydrological continuity and stream bed integrity, not
just water quality.26
25. 1943 WASH. LAws 40; see also Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Ad-
ministrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENvTL. L. 1647 (1991).
26. See e.g., Janet N. Abramowitz, Sustaining Freshwater Ecosystems,
Worldwatch Institute, State of the World Report 60 (1996); see also Center for
1997]
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Those who believe that weak statutes have killed the
salmon should peruse the hydraulics law. It says that those
who propose to "divert" or "change" the "natural flow or bed"
of any river or stream must win the endorsement of the fish-
eries authorities. They must extend "written approval" of
"the adequacy" of the means outlined for the "protection of
fish life." Violators are guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Their
illegal projects are declared "public nuisances" subject to
abatement.
Courageous fish and game staffers fought hundreds of
battles in Washington State under the hydraulics law. They
challenged violators and counseled cooperators who planned
their work around the return of the salmon. They won a few
prosecutors to the cause. They flexed this legal weapon like
none other in the pro-fisheries arsenal, and they won some of
their battles.
But the strength and breadth of the hydraulics law was
its own undoing. Agency staffers gradually found themselves
awash in a sea of salmon crime. They learned the same les-
son as the administrators of the no-discharge provisions of
the Refuse Act and the enforcers of the no-take provisions of
the Endangered Species Act. They discovered that when vio-
lations mount, when offenders are one's neighbors, and when
crime becomes the norm, the problem is not with the behav-
ior. The problem is with the law.
One study by the Washington Department of Fisheries
(Department) in 1975 catalogued over 10,000 streams in the
Puget Sound area alone, with this fish habitat covering al-
most one quarter of the land area of Washington State. The
study warned that "salmon production habitat is being lost at
an accelerating rate.27 If this trend is not changed in the
near future, the natural salmon populations will decline
faster than they can be replaced by artificially produced
fish."28 The causes for the hydraulics law nullification were
Streamside Studies, College of Forest Resources, College of Ocean & Fishery
Sciences, University of Washington, 7th Annual Review (Jan. 30, 1997).
27. WASHINGTON DEPT. OF FISHERIES, A CATALOG OF WASHINGTON STREAMS
(1975).
28. See id.
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the common culprits of benign ignorance and rank favoritism.
Thus, said the Department, one of the biggest problems in
administering the law "is a lack of awareness on part of pri-
vate individual[s], private corporations, and public agencies.
Most are not aware that a permit is required to work in a
stream. Most are unfamiliar with the types of restrictions
that are placed on hydraulic projects, and many don't even
know if fish use occurs in the stream involved."29 As for pros-
ecutions, said the Department, a reoccurring problem is the
attitude of the local courts when the Department attempts to
prosecute a hydraulics violation. Convictions are rarely ob-
tained. When they are, the penalties are usually so low that
they provide little if any deterrent to future violations.30
But the problems ran deeper than ignorance and indiffer-
ence. State legislators constantly harped on hydraulics law
enforcement which touched their constituents. The law was
amended frequently to accommodate those whose inconve-
niences carried legislative weight. Enforcement often came
up against sister agencies, such as the Department of Trans-
portation, that made a business of disrupting culverts and
modifying streams. Indeed, hydraulics law enforcement be-
came an issue within the Departments of Fisheries and Game
themselves as the hatchery folks and stream rehabilitation
types went about the business of rendering the streams more
congenial to their ambitions.
No date can be marked as the moment hydraulics law
enforcement was abandoned to the vandals who were bring-
ing civilization down upon the salmon. State enforcers,
though, like the Indians who wanted to save the fish, gradu-
ally were overcome by forces that never relaxed. The hydrau-
lics law enforcers gave way before the cumulative effort of the
gravel removers, water diverters, pipeline builders, and cul-
vert designers.
The hydraulics law was no unwelcome sleeper. It was no
rude intruder into the mission of fish-protecting agencies.
There was a will to enforce, but no way to do it. Regulation
29. Id. at 2.
30. See id. at 1-2.
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never works in the face of massive resistance. Those who are
called upon to do the job will abandon the effort when the
pain becomes too great, leaving a law that is false and hollow.
E. Process Transformation: Law as Attrition
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)31 is com-
monly regarded as the most significant environmental law
on the planet. It has been copied worldwide, and its inspira-
tion is said to extend to the laws of 150 nations. 32 NEPA has
a strong process component. It requires federal agencies to
study the effects of their actions, alternatives, and mitigation
measures. But nobody ever said that NEPA was concerned
solely with process. At least, nobody said that until the
Supreme Court put its stamp on the law.
In a series of twelve decisions in the 1970s and '80s, the
high court slowly squeezed the life out of this law. These de-
cisions covered twenty-two separate legal issues.3 3 The effort
culminated in a unanimous 1989 decision announcing that
the United States Forest Service could approve a new town-
sized ski resort at Sandy Butte in the Methow Valley within
the Columbia River watershed. This project could go ahead
even if the result was total destruction of a herd of 30,000
mule deer that frequented the area. "In this case," said the
Court, "it would not have violated NEPA if the Forest Ser-
vice, after complying with the Act's procedural requirements,
had decided that the benefits to be derived from downhill ski-
ing at Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a special use per-
mit, notwithstanding the loss of fifteen percent, fifty percent,
or even one-hundred percent of the mule deer herd."34
A high court content with the destruction of deer might
be similarly content with the destruction of fish. But there is
more to this tale than the obvious inference that the Supreme
Court is careless about its own form-over-substance rumina-
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1969).
32. Interview with Nicholas A. Robinson, Professor at Pace University
School of Law (Apr. 1997).
33. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimickry and Recruit-
ment in Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485 (1990).
34. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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tions. The agencies and the lawyers that served them worked
hard to make NEPA compatible with their ways. The cases
brought to the Supreme Court were tactically and serially
aligned to produce a law that became all process and no sub-
stance. The justices themselves are closely attuned to - in-
deed they are selected for - an ideology of judicial restraint
that finds satisfaction in the superficialities of process. Legal
academics have claimed that justice is process, and nothing
else,35 while the law business thrives on this bumper crop of
legal motion.
NEPA has generated industries of impact assessment.
But the process is so thoroughly neutral and so completely
oblivious to result that those who resort to its use are not the
protectors of the fish, but fish despoilers who say their rights
were insufficiently weighed. Indeed, the one dam in the en-
tire Northwest that has been mostly thoroughly studied
under NEPA is not one of the fish-killers at Bonneville, or at
Hells Canyon, or at Pelton, or at Three Mile Falls on the
Umatilla. It is on the Elwha River where the action chal-
lenged is not the deed that removed the better part of ten
separate runs of these great fish from the face of the Earth.
This hard and relentless process has come down on the propo-
sal to remove the dams and restore the fish if that can be
done. 36
F. Exception: Law as Contingency
The Clean Water Act (CWA) 37 is considered one of the
success stories of environmental law, but it has not been im-
mune from the historical accidents that send law into empty
orbits from which there is no escape. The CWA drew a dis-
tinction between "point sources" that were strongly regulated
35. See e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (1980).
36. Compare Oregon Natural Resources Council, 15 Damnable Dams (1994)
(discussing the region's most destructive dams), with U.S. Department of Inte-
rior, National Park Service, Elwha River Ecosystem Restoration Implementa-
tion (Draft EIS April, 1996) (for the best studied dam) and Final Environmental
Impact Statement (Nov. 1996).
37. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1995) [hereinafter CWA].
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and "nonpoint sources" that were primarily overlooked. In
the CWA's major rewrite of 1972, a few powerful interests -
irrigators among them - succeeded in getting their particular
conveyances of pollution excluded from the category of "point
source."38 The dam builders and dam operators followed a
more circuitous route.
In 1973, Alan G. Kirk, then the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA) Acting Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement and General Counsel, wrote a letter announcing
that dams were not "point sources."39 He had fired the first
round in a ten-year legal campaign that would confirm his
conviction that dams should not be brought under the strin-
gent supervision of the permit process.
It was difficult for the EPA to let the dams go free. The
key to a legal understanding of a point source is that some-
body is responsible, and that something can be done to avoid
the damage. The dams were good candidates on this score.
The formal definition of a point source includes any "pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit."40 These dams were teeming
with penstocks, pipes, channels, and ditches that brought un-
happiness to the fish.41 The law said that point sources must
be responsible for the addition of pollutants to navigable wa-
ters. Gas bubble disease looked suspiciously like water pass-
ing over a structure where it takes on atmospheric gases that
work their damage when added to the pools below. The EPA
staffers knew in the 1970s that gas bubble disease was re-
sponsible for the largest fish kill in Missouri history: 421,000
fish. It happened below the Corps-built Harry S. Truman
Dam on the Osage River. The EPA staffers were told that on
the Columbia River, the dams, if kept immune from law,
38. Presently exempted from the definition of "point source" are "agricul-
tural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." CWA
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (1994). Some materials, including well injec-
tions in oil and gas operations, are exempted from the definition of "pollutant."
See id. § 1362(6).
39. Quoted in Brief for Federal Appellant 35, National Wildlife Federation
v. Gorsuch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, June
1981.
40. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
41. See supra note 38, § 1362(14).
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would kill two million salmon and steelhead between 1976
and 2000.42
But the law overcame all of these troubling signs for dam
owners. The environmental law experts for the Justice De-
partment argued43 that the two million dams would repre-
sent a 28-fold increase in the number of facilities regulated.
They said that the dams did not discharge anything, reason-
ing that navigable water cannot discharge pollutants into it-
self.44 They declared that the pollution from these dams was
a natural phenomena. 45 They demanded that great deference
be accorded to this expert agency - an agency that soon had
several members of its executive team in prison or under in-
vestigation for corruption. 46
Judge Patricia Wald wrote the judicial opinion that made
these wishes come true.47 The strongest environmentalist to
sit on the D.C. Circuit in the last twenty years, Judge Wald
wrote a beautiful essay on why courts should defer to the
EPA. Her opinion is a famous monument in the history of
environmental law, and its elegant expressions grace law
school casebooks. But it did not help the fish. It did not help
the Indians. Still, it was a fine and memorable legal moment.
In law, as in other human endeavors, there is frequently
no turning back. The courts said that dams were not point
sources. This triggered the contingency that soon became fro-
zen into certainty. The prospect that dams are point sources
will not be revisited. No informed lawyer today believes
otherwise.
Those who think wistfully of these legal might-have-
beens can renourish their regrets when they read the 1993
Snake River Salmon Recovery Plan. Found there are the ge-
neric fishway criteria that might have been applied and en-
42. See e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
43. See supra text accompanying note 39.
44. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
45. See id. at 178.
46. See 3 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDE &
Toxic SUBSTANCES, § 7.2 at 532-33 (1988).
47. See Gorsuch, 693 F. 2d at 175.
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forced against the dams.48 These criteria include rules on
elevation between the pools, water level differentials between
adjacent weirs, fishway channel velocities, and debris condi-
tions at ladder exits. Inspections by Corps biologists show
"out-of-criteria" conditions for the following percentages of in-
spections at the eight mainstream dams on the Columbia
River: Bonneville, 65%; the Dalles, 30%; John Day, 33%; Mc-
Nary, 41%; Ice Harbor, 52%; Lower Monumental, 86%; Little
Goose, 100%; and Lower Granite, 44%.49 These gross viola-
tions might have been avoided by a permit. Fish will die in
these conditions. But we know with legal certitude that they
will not die from the "addition" of "pollutants" from a "point
source."
G. Pretense: Law as Pontification and Mythology
Environmental laws are filled with empty threats. Some
of these are designed to be mere postulations. Others had
emptiness thrust upon them. Law serves nicely as a source of
moral pronouncement. It serves, too, as the resting place for
the self-deceptions and hopes that accumulate in this written
record of social ambition.
Congress made its most famous moral pronouncement in
the Clean Water Act in 1972 when it said that all discharges
into navigable waters shall cease by 1985.50 The lawmakers
meant by this not that all pollution shall cease by 1985 but
that those deliberately dumping poisons into the water - that
is, the point sources - would have thirteen years to stop.5 1
Some courts read this "no discharge" pronouncement as an
indication that less pollution should be preferred to more.52
48. See Snake River Salmon Recovery Team, Recommendation Prepared for
Peer Review XI-6 (Oct. 1993).
49. See id., at XI-7 (weekly inspections by COE biologists in 1988).
50. See CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). ("It is the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985."); John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233 (1990).
51. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER
§ 1.3, at 19-21 (1986).
52. See id.
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But this form of mild accommodation is insufficient for
the angry ideologues lightly trained in economics who now
populate the federal appellate courts. It was to this constitu-
ency that Judge Patricia Wald spoke in her decision excusing
the dams from their point-source burdens. Of the "no-dis-
charge" goal, she explained that Congress thought it was un-
enforceable. It was not based on refined cost estimates. It
was quite possibly "beyond the ability of the American people
to absorb the cost."53
Congress frequently says that costs and benefits should
be carefully weighed when saving the fish.54 When Congress
speaks, courts do not rush forth to brush aside the advice as
morally bankrupt or ecologically unacceptable. Judge Wald's
remarks are a small aside and long forgotten. But they serve
as a reminder that the courts are the keepers of legal myths.
They choose to tell us that subscribers to the myth of no-pol-
lution must be exposed as hypocrites. But the myth of cost-
benefit analysis is a prerogative of Congress.
In another illustration, the CWA declares that the dis-
charge of pollutants from sewage treatment plants shall
achieve secondary treatment by July 1, 1977.55 But raw sew-
age overflows make regular appearances without legal conse-
quence if (as they frequently are) combined with stormwater.
These are called combined stormwater overflow (CSO)
events. This practice appeared to be legally vulnerable when
the City of Portland received its discharge permit requiring
that the city maintain water quality standards. It is not pos-
sible to have a CSO event without violating the water quality
standard for fecal coliform. 56 But to the rescue came the
judges, reviving a twenty-year-old technicality in the law,
who announced that citizens could not enforce this obligation
53. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 181.
54. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health
and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
55. See CWA § 301(b)(1)(A). The deadline was extended later to July 1988.
PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 888
(2d ed., 1986).
56. Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Portland, 11 F.3d 900,
906-11 (9th Cir. 1993), withdrawn and vacated on rehearing 56 F.3d 979 (9th
Cir. 1995).
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because it was a "water quality standard" and not an "efflu-
ent limitation."57 This small product of judicial sabotage may
yet be overcome, 58 and the moment celebrated as a great en-
vironmental victory. But the loss is entirely self-inflicted and
fully the product of a point of view that sheds no tears over
empty law. Our legal system expends effort daily on a litany
of occult methodology of no discernible benefit to the fish or to
the people who rely upon them.
International environmental law is pathetically bereft of
enforcement, but most law students do not know this when
they study the famous Trail Smelter59 case that announces
the intuitively satisfying rule that states "must answer for
environmental harm" to people of other nations caused by ac-
tivities within the territories.60 The Trail Smelter case,
which went ahead in the 1930s and '40s, allowed recovery in
an arbitration proceeding for damage to Washington resi-
dents from smelter fumes originating in Canada. But the
practical problem is that forums to press these claims are
generally unavailable. Law students who believe what they
read about the Trail Smelter case should go to the Colville
Reservation, and travel by boat around Lake Roosevelt,
where they will observe miles of curious black sand hugging
the shoreline. These images represent the sludge discharges
from the same smelter that was the subject of the pro-envi-
ronmental rulings in the 1940s. Students will hear of the tox-
ins slowly accumulating in the fish that were made
permanent residents by the Grand Coulee Dam. These resi-
dues are the products of the smelter at Trail and of the pulp
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941).
60. U.S. v. Canada, 3 U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 1911 (1941). Compare R.
Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental
Harm, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 15 (F.
Francioni & T. Scovazzi eds., 1991), quoted in L.D. GURUSWAMY, SIR JEFFREY
W.R. PALMER & B.H. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 332, 333 (West Publishing Co.,
1994) with Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1963-81
(1941).
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mill at Sellgard, B.C. that pour their wastes into the lake be-
low from which there is no escape.
The Colville Tribe is a proud people. Their lawyers are
second to none. They do not fear lawsuits. They know what
is at stake. They understand what the law promises them.
They are helpless, because this law exists only in the minds
of reporters.
The last example of environmental law that is missing in
practice on the Columbia River is section 303(d) of the CWA.
Since 1972, this law has required states to identify so-called
water quality limited segments - stream stretches where
point source controls are insufficient to protect water qual-
ity.61 These are streams ruined by the logging, mining, graz-
ing, agriculture, irrigation and damming of which many
studies speak.62 The 1972 law anticipated that the listings
would be followed by the development of state plans to limit
the contributions of the responsible parties (called "total max-
imum daily loads")63 so that compliance could be achieved.
But none of this happened until the nullification was
brought to a halt by a series of court orders in the early 1990s
requiring the EPA to take over the listing duties.6 Thus,
61. See 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: Am & WATER,
§ 4.18 at 281-85 (1986).
62. See e.g., Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: Restoration
of Salmonid Fisheries in the Columbia River Ecosystem, passim (Sept. 10,
1996) (Development of an Alternative Conceptual Foundation and Review and
Synthesis of Science Underlying the Columbia River Basin Fish & Wildlife Pro-
gram); 1996 NRC Upstream Study; 1997 Study on Pacific Salmon & Their
Ecosystems.
63. See Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962, 965
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 1996).
64. See Rodgers, supra note 48, at 281-85; see also Idaho Sportsmen's Coa-
lition v. Browner, 43 FRC 1289, 1996 WL 710883 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 1996),
(Dwyer J.) (taking up enforcement of TMDLs for the streams in Idaho; this case
explains that Idaho submitted no water quality limited segment list to the EPA
until 1989, seventeen years after enactment of the 1972 Amendments, and ten
years after the statutory due date; in this case, the EPA is proposing a schedule
to develop all necessary TMDLs by 2021, which an intervening industry group
"Clean Water for Idaho," challenges as unreasonably hasty; the court disap-
proved this casual quarter-century allocated to development of the tool for com-
pliance (which is not the same thing as compliance; it holds that the year 2021
was capricious as too slow, and remands for the choice of another date while
recommending five years as reasonable).
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while the offenders merely stand by awaiting their legal fate,
the waterbodies they destroyed are placed upon a rapidly-
growing casualty list. In 1993-94, the EPA had listed no
more than 100 stream segments in the Northwest states; in
early 1997, the numbers had ballooned to 2500-3000 streams
in trouble. 65 The listing, of course, is but preparation for
some distant day of legal reckoning, although many fear the
fish will not be here to celebrate it.
There are many reasons why law does not happen. The
fish do not understand these reasons. Only human satisfac-
tion blinks on or shuts down when these laws come alive or go
inert. Laws that do not deliver benefits directly to the fish do
not deserve to be called environmental laws. They should be
called pretended law.
H. Marginization: Law as Scapegoat
1. Individually Identifiable Pinnipeds
No better example of environmental law gone bad can be
found than the six dense pages of the 1994 Amendments to
the Marine Mammal Protection Act.66 This law makes excep-
tions to the general protection of marine mammals. It invites
a state to apply to the Secretary of Commerce to authorize
"the intentional lethal taking" of "individually identifiable
pinnipeds" that have a "significant negative impact" on cer-
tain salmonid fishery stocks.67 The fisheries stocks protected
are those that are endangered or threatened or those that
"migrate through the Ballard Locks at Seattle, Wash-
ington."68
This law has all the trappings of modern environmental
law. It includes particularized public notice and input re-
quirements, 69 and scraps of cost-benefit analysis. There must
65. See Chuck Clarke, Regional Administrator, EPA, Region X, "Can we in-
tegrate the ESA and the Clean Water Act?" Law Seminars International, Con-
ference on the Endangered Species Act, Jan. 30-31, 1997, Bellevue, Wash.
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
67. Id.
68. Id. at §120(b)(1).
69. Applications to take are to include "a means of identifying the individ-
ual pinniped or pinnipeds." Id. at § 120(b)(2).
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be "a detailed description of the problem of interaction and
expected benefits of the taking."70 This law also has a
splendid advisory mechanism that would satisfy the most de-
manding of political scientists. It establishes a Pinniped-
Fishery Interaction Task Force that includes representation
from every conceivable interest group including the Indian
treaty tribes, conservation and fishing groups.7 1
This law expects the very best of science. It calls for sci-
entific representation on the Task Force. 72 It specifies scien-
tific factors to be written into the legal criteria;
decisionmakers are to weigh "the extent to which such pinni-
peds are causing undue injury or impact to, or imbalance
with, other species in the ecosystem, including fish popula-
tions."73 It requires the use of scientific methodology. The
law specifies that each control measure, including non-lethal
alternatives, be evaluated after implementation in accord-
ance with the wise dictates of adaptive management. 74
There is considerable biology bound up in this "nuisance
pinniped" law. Much of it is inattentive to Darwin. The fish-
run foremost in the minds of these lawmakers is the steel-
head run that passes through the Corps-managed Ballard
Locks that connect freshwater Lake Washington on the east-
ern side of Seattle with saltwater Puget Sound on the west.
Historically, the Locks did not exist. Nor did the steelhead
run now passing through it. No one knows precisely the pedi-
gree of the fish, although suspicions have been raised by ge-
netic tests showing traces of stocks originating in the McLoud
River, California. This is where Livingston Stone established
his first West Coast hatchery. The reason this law undertook
to protect the fish that "migrate through the Ballard Locks"
in Seattle is that these fish were thought to lack the biological
significance that would justify listing and protection under
the Endangered Species Act.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at § 120(c)(2).
73. Id. at § 120(d)(3).
74. See id. at § 120(c)(5).
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A second curious feature of this "nuisance pinniped" law
is its focus on "individually identifiable pinnipeds" that were
perceived to be making life difficult for the steelhead at the
Locks. This bad-actor or deviancy theory may have some
credence for humans trapped in unpromising environ-
ments.7 5 But who could imagine that a predation strategy
that worked for sea lion A would not be immediately ex-
ploited by sea lion B if the opportunity arose? Who could pre-
sume that the cornering of steelhead was a specialized
knowledge of a sea lion underworld? Only staffers and mem-
bers of Congress who know nothing of Darwin, but who prefer
to believe that pinniped extirpation is but a selective removal
operation akin to taking a few criminals off the streets.
2. The Biology of Scapegoats
The strongest biology in this "nuisance pinniped" law is
human behavior. It is also the least admirable. Since 1980,
triggermen of one sort or another have shot 254 seals and sea
lions in the waters of Puget Sound.76 We do not know but can
only suspect that most of the damage was done not by honest
fishermen but by poachers and vandals who find gratification
in the pain they inflict. Only the 255th execution on this list
was authorized by law, and the motivation for this act was
not to punish a pinniped but to save the steelhead run that
pass through the Ballard Locks.
It takes a highly selective thinker to believe that sea lion
predation is the key to survival of the winter steelhead run at
the Ballard Locks, which is subject to the usual confounding
forces that besiege all anadromous fish on land and at sea.
See Graphic 5, "What Are the Influences on Decline of Winter
Steelhead Run at the Ballard Locks?" But a scapegoat fre-
75. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL - WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE
ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 222 (1994) (pointing out
that Martin Daly and Margo Wilson have argued that the "short time horizons"
for which criminals are famous may be an "adaptive response to the predictive
information about one's prospects for longevity and eventual success"), citing M.
Daly & M. Wilson, Homicide (1988).
76. See data presented at Conference on Pacific Salmon & Their Ecosys-
tems: Status and Future Options, Jan. 10-12, 1994.
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quently emerges in human affairs because it fulfills precisely
this purpose of selective focus, and of assigning blame and
exacting retribution. 77 The scapegoat serves as an imagined
solution to a real problem.
This brings the bad-actor theory of the "nuisance pinni-
ped" law into better focus. The California sea lions that
brought attention to the steelhead at the Ballard Locks were
excellent scapegoats. They had recently arrived in the Puget
Sound area - a legal by-product, some said, of the pro-pinni-
ped sentiments bound up in the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1970. They were native to California, which counts for
two strikes in Washington. They were all male, another debit
that made most of them biologically superfluous. 78 And they
ate fish in plain view, which stripped them of the pretense of
innocence enjoyed by other offenders who did their steelhead
malefactions in the anonymity of the high seas. It was easy
enough for public opinion to saddle these proven killers with
rumors of wrongs unconfirmed. These sea lions, it was be-
lieved, preferred heads, not the fillets of the fish. These wan-
ton connoisseurs were suspected of killing eight or ten
instead of one fully consumed.
If the "nuisance pinniped" law was not designed to be a
scapegoat law, it soon became one. These troublesome sea
lions who gathered at the Ballard Locks were given a name -
"Hershel" was the moniker. In the early days, "Hershel" was
a generic name applied to several of the sea lions who enjoyed
the steelhead diet available at the Locks. But one "Hershel"
soon emerged as the leader of the Hershels. He secured his
reputation in the winter of 1993-94 when observers blamed
him for consuming 60% of the dwindling steelhead run. He
was given a name - Hondo, No. 17 by a biologist and long-
time Boston Celtics fan and admirer of a great player from an
77. See e.g., MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE WEIRD THINGS:
PSEUDOSCIENCE, SUPERSTITION, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS OF OUR TIME ch. 7
(1997) ("Epidemics of Accusations: Medieval and Modern Witch Crazes").
Among the editorials for execution, see Don Hannula, A Foul Wind of California
Hypocrisy Over Sea Lions, SEATTLE TIMES, March 28, 1996, at B4.
78. On animals "superfluous" to breeding, see COLIN TUDGE, LAST ANIMALS
AT THE Zoo: How MAss EXTINCTION CAN BE STOPPED 1, 84 (1992).
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earlier era, John Havlicek. Like the Havlicek of old, sea lion
No. 17 overwhelmed the defenses set before him. Stopping
him became a personal thing.
Eventually, Hondo, No. 17, would take the blame for the
decline in the Ballard Locks Winter Steelhead Run. He
would be the 255th victim in the war against pinnipeds that
is now being waged in the name of the salmon. But he would
be given every legal chance. He would enjoy the finest due
process environmental law has to offer. He would hear the
best of science brought to bear on his case. He would be the
beneficiary of an exacting exercise in adaptive management.
3. NEPA's Due Process
The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) was one of
the first laws brought to bear to Hondo's advantage. It re-
quired carefully assessing the effects and evaluating the al-
ternatives before undertaking a major action such as sea lion
removal. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
wrote a meticulous and balanced document explaining why
removing sea lions would help the steelhead. 79 The NMFS
assessment rejected outright the alternative of introducing
sea lion predators, such as killer whales, sharks, and polar
bears, into the Ballard Locks area of urban Seattle.
There is a multitude of problems with this measure. Be-
sides the legal (Marine Mammal Protection Act and NEPA)
and logistical problems with the capture and survival of the
predators, it would not be feasible to keep such predators in
the area. If they did stay, they would likely also prey on
steelhead thereby exacerbating the predation problem. Large
sharks, if they survived capture and transfer to the Locks,
could jeopardize public safety. Given the problems with this
measure, it does not warrant further consideration.8 0
The "hormonal injection" alternative, like the polar bear
option mentioned above, was turned down, but in a reasoned
79. Compare National Marine Fisheries Service, Washington Department
of Fish and Wildlife, Environmental Assessment on Protecting Winter-run Wild
Steelhead from Predation by California Sea Lions (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter 1995
SEA LION-STEELHEAD ASSESSMENT], with id. at 76.
80. See TUDGE at 75-76.
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and convincing way. This measure would involve stimulating
the sea lions to begin their southward migration several
months early by changing the sea lions' hormonal balance
through the use of reproductive hormones. The hormones
would alter the animal's physiological state, thereby stimu-
lating the animal's preparation for the breeding season. Use
of hormones on wild sea lions is untested and it is uncertain
whether it would result in the desired behavioral change,
NMFS declared. This technique also could be combined with
a relocation program whereby the sea lion's hormonal bal-
ance would be changed to increase the probability that the
animal would migrate back to their breeding area in South-
ern California. Testing with captive animals would be neces-
sary before this technique is applied to wild animals. This
measure could also raise concerns in California due to the
early return of sea lions.8 '
Hondo never lived to see the hormone experiment. He
surely did not regret missing his opportunity to test the toler-
ance of Californians with an early and untimely return.
Throughout his life, Hondo received ample due process from
the fractious group of twenty-one people that NMFS con-
vened as its Pinniped-Fishery Interaction Task Force. In the
middle of this was Seattle District Engineer Colonel Tim
Wynn, operator of the Ballard Locks, who endured the indig-
nities of these proceedings with the weary resignation of a
man born 100 years too late. Here was a figure temperamen-
tally suited to ride the Palouse with Colonel George Wright
and grapple with Indians like the ferocious Qulchen - a "ti-
ger" of a man it took six men to subdue.8 2 Yet, here he was in
the late twentieth century, presiding at the trial of a sea lion;
and being assailed, no less, with sassy questions from envi-
ronmentalists about the dysfunctions of the Corps' own Locks
and the failings of the fish ladders that had served as a model
for the great engineering success at Bonneville.
81. See id.
82. See WILLIAM COMPTON BROWN, THE INDIAN SIDE OF THE STORY 292, 302
(1961).
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4. Adaptive Mismanagement
The NMFS staffers and their partners systematically
rolled through the options that would save the fish and keep
the sea lions alive. The sea lions defeated every strategy
aimed their way. They strengthened the admiration of their
defenders while they reinforced the resentments of their de-
tractors. In the process, they gave us an excellent case study
in how adaptive management can be applied adroitly to ques-
tions that never should have been asked (See Graphic 6,
"Adaptive Management and Sea Lions").
With the problem defined as sea lions preying on steel-
head at the Locks, adaptive management thus was let loose.
The managers attempted to deter the sea lions with "seal
bombs." But the clever respondents learned to dive to depth
when the missiles entered the water. All that resulted from
the failed experiment was the sea lions returning to the sur-
face and picking up the struggling fish "incidentally" stunned
by the "seal bombs."
The managers then sought to isolate the fish mingling at
the mouth of the Locks with variously designed "entangle-
ment nets." These were brushed aside by various "over,
under, and through" strategies that required little exertion
from these 600-800 pound marine acrobats. The managers
also ran "test aversion" experiments with chemically contam-
inated steelhead. The sea lions quickly learned to reject the
proffer of dead fish from people in yellow suits.
The managers introduced a ten-inch mesh "sea lion bar-
rier" that would allow the steelhead to pass, but not the sea
lions. Unfortunately, the steelhead did not know about this
advantage; no one could make them aware of it, so they shied
away from the ten-inch mesh as they might from a one-inch
mesh. They were trapped there by the sea lions as efficiently
as they could have been against a fine brick wall.
Increases in the degrees of violence made no difference.
The managers turned to sea lion "anesthetics," and killed a
few. However, the managers soon learned that dose-response
rates derived from bears do not apply to marine mammals on
a weight-for-weight basis. They turned to trapping the sea
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lions, putting them in trucks, and removing them to the Pa-
cific Coast, only to learn that the animals returned rapidly to
the Ballard Locks. One of the returnees was Rapid Rudy,
whose feats received immediate consideration for North
American marine mammal speed records.
Next came a serious removal strategy. It was aimed, as
all effective removals are, not at individually identifiable can-
didates but at those who could be found and captured. Six of
the animals were trapped at the Locks, trucked to southern
California in the face of objections under the Coastal Zone
Management Act, and released some 2000 miles from the for-
bidden waters of Puget Sound. Even this sea lion version of
the Oklahoma territory was not sufficiently distant. Three
sea lions returned in a matter of months. Two disappeared.
One compromised by taking up residence in the Columbia
River.8 3
The sea lions at the Locks were attacked with "Bear
Stingers" shot from crossbows. The sea lions met this strat-
egy with hasty dives that created wicked ricochets as the mis-
siles glanced off the surface of the water. Lawyers, with
recurring nightmares of wounded schoolchildren "inciden-
tally" caught in the crossfire at the Locks, called off the
campaign.
Then came the 220 decibels of sound in the hearing range
of the sea lions - truly painful to the ones not already deaf.
83. Compare 1995 SEA-LION-STEELHEAD ASSESSMENT at 63 ("Of the thirty-
seven sea lions captured between February 17, 1989 and April 19, 1989 and
released on the outer coast, twenty-nine were subsequently observed back in
Puget Sound in about fifteen days. Twelve of the returning animals were recap-
tured one or more times and were relocated each time to the outer Washington
Coast;" of the six California sea lions marked and transported to southern Cali-
fornia in 1990, return did not occur until thirty to forty-five days following re-
lease; in April of 1994, three sea lions were returned to the Channel Islands,
never to be seen again; ed. a successful relocation program?), with id. at 65
("relocation would not provide a total resolution to the problem") and id. at 95
(explaining why the removal and transport of six "problem" sea lions in 1990
did not solve the predation problem: "this increase in predation was not due to
replacement by new animals, it was because not all of the 'problem' sea lions
that had been observed eating steelhead during the season were captured").
Thus the "best available science" is made to work: when the bad-actor hypothe-
sis is contradicted by empirical evidence, the problem is redefined by expanding
the definition of the bad actor.
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But more painful yet to the managers was the sight of Hondo,
returning to the scene. Although obviously distressed by the
noise, he succeeded in defeating it by the simple tactic of
staying in turbulent water.
5. Protective Custody
In the spring of 1995, Hondo was-physically captured and
detained for two months in a facility near Tacoma. To avoid
imprinting, he had no human contact, a deprivation he did
not noticeably regret. He was fed by remote control. The
NMFS took pictures of him with mouth agape, beneath the
chute of herring being refueled like a great tanker. He
gained 120 pounds during captivity, and grew into what staff-
ers describe as the most awesome sea lion they had ever seen.
The literature speaks of monster California sea lions, weigh-
ing in at 800 to 900 pounds. Hondo tipped the scales at a
svelte 1100 pounds.
Hondo had one jail break to his credit. He broke through
the fence in a school yard and added to his legend with a
forceful display of defiance. Hondo fought for his life and
freedom tirelessly and with great tenacity. He deserves to be
admired.
6. Life Without Parole
The adaptive management options ran out for Hondo in
the spring of 1996 with the steelhead at an all-time low and
official patience nearly expired. The state got its permit to
kill five of these "identifiable" pinnipeds. But nobody shot
Hondo. This is the age of win-win compromise. Even vindic-
tive judgments are cautiously executed.
So Hondo was captured once again, together with Bob
and Big Frank. He was placed aboard a Federal Express
cargo jet for a new home at Sea World of Florida in Orlando.
A Sea World manager said this was a lovely spot: "It has a
large body of water and rock work the animals can haul out
on and there is a wave generating machine."8 4
84. Darrell Glover, See You at Sea World: Sea lions jet to new home today,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 29, 1996, at B1.
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Removal is always a better strategy than murder. It is
cleaner, every bit as effective, and history takes responsibil-
ity. Oregon's first Governor, Joseph Lane, knew this when he
pushed for removing the Indians from the Willamette Valley.
The fish authorities knew this when they won their small re-
moval victory at the Ballard Locks.
Within a year, Hondo was dead at Sea World, unsus-
taoned even by the wave-making machine. But he had the
best of care. No scientist could say that he died for want of
freedom. And he certainly did not die in vain. The fish man-
agers already see signs of recovery in the Ballard steelhead
run,8 5 although the reasons for improvement remain un-
known. It might have been the underwater transmitters, or a
fake plastic orca brought into the area, or the removals, but
fish passage at the Locks is no longer exploited by opportunis-
tic sea lions. Many see this as validation of the "bad actor"
sea lion theory.
This "Hershel Law" is no ancient and misshapen thing.
It is no dead hand of past that constrains the better judg-
ments of contemporaries. It is thoroughly modern - in its fo-
cus on symptoms, in its substitution of technique for
judgment, in its service to the darker instincts that blame-
fixing requires.
IV. Conclusion
Reading the geology of environmental law is not an easy
task. Truths can be hidden, buried, accreted over, and
twisted under. Illusions can be pushed to the surface,
strengthened by transformation, and revealed by accident,
but the process is run by lawyers. There is always room for
their self-deceptions and rationalizations. However, there is
room, too, for their creative rushes and constructive
innovations.
85. See Dee Norton, Fewer Sea Lions Mean More Trout at Locks, SEArLE
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at Bi; see also Scott Sunde, Steelhead Run Looks Good at
the Locks, SEArLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 1997, at B1.
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Attachment 1. Strategies for Defeating Environmental
Laws
ect. The practice of agencies to disregard or ignore laws or
regulations that promise no contemporary advantage.
Diversion.
Acquisition and
Sale.
Abandonment.
Process
Transformation.
Exception.
Pretense.
Marginalization.
The tendency of lawmakers to create islands of
specialty that are immune from generally applicable
laws and operate independently of customary
oversight mechanisms.
The practice of agencies to trade legal advantage for
an asset that is valued more highly or is susceptible to
characterization as affording sufficient restitution for
the loss.
The practice of agencies to relinquish enforcement of
laws shown by experience to be excessively costly in
terms of resource allocation, political retaliation, or
staff or public disaffection.
The tendency of courts and agencies to read
environmental laws as prescribing decision processes
rather than outcomes. This practice is fed by win-win
ideologies and slows adaptive legislative responses
that would ensue if clear winners were identified.
The exclusion of a particular regime from a generally
applicable law. Occasions for exception are greatly
enhanced by incremental, duplicitous, and fractured
lawmaking that multiplies the legal margins where
choice of inclusion and exclusion are made.
The practice of lawmakers to announce goals, profess
principles and proclaim outcomes that are without
adequate means of implementation.
The practice of lawmakers to focus on symptoms
rather than causes and to prescribe elaborate legal
regimes for addressing the symptoms.
Negl
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Graphic 1. Columbia River
Endangered Species Act
(listed species only;
consultation; prohibition on
"takes", absolute protection
-of "critical habitat").
Federal Power Act, (private
projects; must maintain "fishways"
as prescribed by the Secretary of
the Interior) (16 U.S.C.A. Sections
_811, 824a-3(j)(3)).
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Graphic 2. Erosional History of Appalachian
Mountains8 6
THE NEOGENE WORLD
Appalachian Plateau Newer Appalachians Older Appatachians w. Coastal Plain
FIGURE 18-58 Erosional history of the Appalachian Moun- deelopment of the Harrsburg erosion surface. D. Uplift and
talns, A Schooley erosion surface truncating older, folded rocks dissection on the belts of weakest rocks E. Uplift and dissection
of the Appalachians and Cretaceous formations of the coastal of the Somerrlle erosion surface, producing the present condi-
plain. B. Arching of the Schooley erosion surface. C. Dissecuon tion. (After D. W Johnson. Stream Sculpture on the Atlantic
of the Schooley erosion surface by acceleration of erosion and Slope, Columbia Uniersity Press. New York. 193f )
86. STEVEN STANLEY, EARTH AND LIFE THROUGH TIME, fig. 18-58 (1985).
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Graphic 3. Devonian Sedimentary Rocks of New York
State8 7
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FIGURE 13-39 Devonian sedimentary rocks of New York
State. Above: Stratigraphic cross section showing the forma-
tions. Coarse deposits shed from mountains to the east consti-
tute a clastic wedge that is thinning to the west. Below.
Environments of deposition ot the Catskill clastic wedge and
associated deposits of New York State. Braided streams mean-
der seaward from the toot of mountains to the east. These
empty into tidal channels behind barrier islands. Muds are de-
posited offshore. Note that the sequence is regressive (compare
to Figure 13-38). (Upper diagram after P. B. King, The Geologi-
cal Evolution of North America, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1977; lower diagram after J. R. L Allen
and P F. Friend, Geol. SOc. Amer. Spec. Paper 106:21-74.
1968.)
87. Id. at fig. 13-39.
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Graphic 4. Owl Circles
Location of 107 spotted owl site centers
within and adjacent to Plum Creek's
HCP planning area.
_7 v.
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Graphic 5. "What Are the Influences on Decline of
Winter Steelhead Run?"
WHAT ARE THE INFLUENCES ON DECLINE
OF THE WINTER STEELHEAD RUN AT THE BALLARD LOCKS?
W. Rodgem
May 1995
Reckless and Incompetent
hatchery practices
Unknown
Spawning Grounds
El Nino;
Natural I
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Adaptive Management and Sea Lions
Do Sea Lions Eat Steelhead?
If No If Yes
If No Do they still eat
steelhead in the presence of
"Sal Rnmh"?
Graphic 6.
But you don't
want to kill the
Sea Lions
If yes, do they still eat
steelhead that are protected by -
an "entanglement net"?
If No If yes, do they still eat steelhead
after being subjected to a
"taste-aversion" experiment?
If No If yes, do they still eat
steelhead if blocked by a 10-
inch mesh "Sea Lion Barrier"?
If yes, do they still eat
steelhead if they are
"anesthestized"?
If yes, will they still eat steel-
head if transported to the coast -
of Washington?
If yes, is the same thing true if
they are transported to
Southern California?
If yes, do they eat steelhead
If No when under attack by "Bear -
Stingers" shot from crossbows?
If No If yes, do they still eat steelhead if
subjected to 220 decibels of -
sound in their hearing range?
If No If yes, can they eat steelhead if
they are imprisoned and con- -
strained on a herring-only diet?
There is no If yes, rethink
problem. strategy.
If No
If No
If No
If No
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